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Abstract  
Adopting a moral identity perspective, this research examines the moral judgment of hotel 
JXHVWV¶YLQGLFWLYHQHJDWLYHZRUGRIPRXWK:20WRZDrd hotel service failure. This research 
finds that people with higher moral identity centrality are less prone to moral disengagement of 
vindictive negative WOM, especially when their moral awareness of the behavior is higher.  
However, even these individuals may engage in moral disengagement of vindictive negative 
WOM, if they have higher anger toward the service failure, and when their moral awareness is 
lower. These findings highlight the significant roles of moral identity centrality, moral awareness, 
aQGPRUDOHPRWLRQIRUSHRSOH¶VPRUDOMXGJPHQW. Practically, this research suggests hotels may 
manage customer vindictive negative WOM by raising moral awareness and appeasing anger. 
 
Key words: Moral identity; service failure; moral disengagement; moral awareness; anger; 
consumer revenge 
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MORAL DISENGAGEMENT OF HOTEL GUEST NEGATIVE WOM:  
Moral Identity Centrality, Moral Awareness, and Anger 
 
³Anger is a wind which EORZVRXWWKHODPSRIWKHPLQG´ 
Robert Green Ingersoll 
³0RUDOLW\LVEDVHGRQDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIFLUFXPVWDQFHV - QRWSULQFLSOHV´ 
Anonymous  
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is arguable that service failure and consequently displeased customers have always been 
endemic to the hospitality and tourism sectors (Lewis & McCann; 2004; Sánchez-García & 
Currás-Pérez, 2011).  Customer revenge is an increasingly prevalent type of consumer 
misbehavior in response to hotel service failure (Gelbrich, 2010; Sánchez-García & Currás-Pérez, 
2011), and is a growing research issue in tourism and service management (e.g., Bougie, Pieters 
& Zeelenberg 2003; Gelbrich, 2010; Grégoire, Tripp & Legaux, 2009). In particular, the 
opportunity for disgruntled tourists to communicate their displeasure to more than a handful of 
friends and family has been facilitated by recent increases in the availability and usage of the 
internet and social media (Bronner & de Hoog, 2011; Litvin, Goldsmith & Pan, 2008). The 
potential damage that this type of communication can cause to a service provider¶V reputation and 
business viability (de Matos and Rossi 2008; Harris & Dumas, 2009; Reynolds & Harris, 2009) 
underscores the need to determine what factors contribute to this type of consumer behaviour and 
which management practices will minimise its occurrence (Gelbrich, 2010; Grégoire et al., 2009). 
Negative word of mouth (WOM) ± communicating negative information or experiences 
about goods or services ±is particularly prevalent in the hospitality sector (Gelbrich, 2010; Kim, 
Kim & Kim, 2009; Sánchez-García & Currás-Pérez, 2011).  Negative WOM may take two forms 
based on the intended motives. Vindictive negative WOM refers to unfavorable communication 
with the purpose of denigrating a company. It contrasts with support-seeking negative WOM that 
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involves seeking empathy and understanding (Grégoire, Laufer & Tripp, 2010). In general, 
vindictive negative WOM has a more explicit motive of retaliating to service provision than 
support-seeking negative WOM and hence involves stronger moral implications (Grégoire et al., 
2010).  
Prior research has examined the impacts of a number of factors, such as attribution (Hess, 
Ganesan & Klein, 2007; Laczniak, DeCarlo & Ramaswami, 2001), perceived justice (Gelbrich & 
Roschk, 2011; Grégoire and Fisher, 2008; Kim et al., 2009), social comparison (Bonifield & Cole, 
2007), consumer power (Grégoire et al., 2010), and emotional reactions (Gelbrich, 2010; 
Sánchez-García & Currás-Pérez, 2011), on consumer reactions toward service failure.  Although 
such insights are valuable, prior research often fails to acknowledge individual differences of 
consumer morality.   
Consequently, the current study aims to understand the moral identity mechanisms of moral 
judgment (specifically, moral disengagement) of consumer negative WOM. As noted earlier, 
vindictive negative WOM can be seen as a morally relevant issue that involves moral judgment.  
One important psychological mechanism that promotes unethical decision making is moral 
disengagement (Bandura, 1999). Moral disengagement refers to the cognitive deactivation of 
moral self-regulatory processes in decision making. In such circumstances, unethical decisions 
can be made without individuals feeling apparent guilt or self-censure, which increases the 
likelihood that unethical behaviors will be undertaken (Bandura, 1999). One way people may 
justify their unethical behaviors is to compare them selectively with the behaviors of others and 
conclude that their own behaviors are relatively harmless and appropriate (Bandura, 1999). For 
example, a hotel guest may justify their vindictive negative WOM by comparing the consequence 
RIWKLVEHKDYLRUZLWKWKHKDUPWKDWKDVEHHQFDXVHGE\WKHKRWHO¶VVHUYLFHIDLOXUH 
Moral identity constitutes an important identity-related psychological mechanism that 
3 
inhibits moral disengagement (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim & Felps, 2009; Detert, Treviño & 
Sweitzer, 2008).  It refers to a self-schema organized around a set of moral trait associations, 
including caring, compassion, fairness, friendliness, generosity, helpfulness, hardworking, 
honesty, and kindness (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Moral identity centrality refers to the extent to 
which moral identity is pivotal WRDSHUVRQ¶VVHOI-concept or becomes relevant when processing 
social information that is pertinent to moral behaviors. As such, moral identity has a regulating 
function on both moral judgment and behaviors (Reed, Aquino & Levy, 2007; Shao, Aquino & 
Freeman, 2008; Winterich, Mittal & Ross, 2009).   
Although moral disengagement has been studied as a cognitive mechanism to justify 
specific unethical behaviors (e.g., Aquino, Reed, Thau & Freeman, 2007), no prior research has 
examined the role of moral identity centrality in the moral disengagement of specific unethical 
behaviors. In addition, prior research suggests that the regulatory function of moral identity 
centrality may be conditional on both cognitive and emotional factors. From a social cognitive 
perspective, the regulatory power of moral identity centrality depends on both the behaviors in 
question (Reed et al., 2007) and the situational factors (Aquino et al., 2007).  Moreover, recent 
research suggests that emotions play a significant role (especially moderating role) on the 
regulatory function of moral self-concept (e.g., moral identity), as well as the process of moral 
cognition (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2009; Greene & Haidt, 2002).   
Through two studies, this research examines three conditions influencing the effect of moral 
identity on the moral disengagement of negative WOM: the motive of the negative WOM, moral 
awareness of the negative WOM, and the emotional reaction (i.e. degree of anger) toward the 
service failure.  On the cognitive side, this research tests whether people with higher moral 
identity centrality are less prone to moral disengagement of negative WOM with an unethical 
motive; and for people with higher moral awareness of the negative WOM.  Further, on the 
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emotional side, this research examines whether and how anger negatively relates to 
disengagement and interacts with moral identity centrality in predicting moral disengagement.   
MORAL IDENTITY CENTRALITY AND MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 
Moral disengagement  
Moral disengagement is a cognitive mechanism leading to immoral conduct (Bandura, 2002; 
Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1986).  Past research has found that people with 
higher moral disengagement propensity are more likely to be aggressive (Bandura et al., 1996; 
Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli & Regalia, 2001), be in favor of violence against 
animals (Vollum, Buffington-Vollum & Longmire, 2004), and support military force (Aquino et 
al., 2007; McAlister, Bandura & Owen, 2006).  Moreover, moral disengagement has been related 
to organizational corruption (Moore, 2008), workplace harassment (Claybourn, 2011), 
andviolations of civic duties (Caprara et al., 2009).  As such, moral disengagement can also serve 
as a means to justify dishonest acts (Shu, Gino & Bazerman, 2011).  However, to date, little 
research has examined more morally-ambiguous behaviors that are difficult to  be classified as 
either purely evil or purely good (such as consumer negative WOM).   
Advantageous comparison refers to comparing selectively the focal behavior of interest 
with another behavior (mainly the cause of that behavior) so that the behavior can be justified and 
viewed as righteous (Bandura, 1999).  As such, advantageous comparison is a particularly salient 
form of moral disengagement in the case of consumer revenge (Aquino et al., 2007).  Bandura et 
al. (1996, p. 365) argue that ³by exploiting advantageous comparison with more reprehensible 
DFWLYLWLHVLQMXULRXVFRQGXFWFDQEHUHQGHUHGEHQLJQRUPDGHWRDSSHDUWREHRIOLWWOHFRQVHTXHQFH´.  
As such, Bandura (1999) argues that advantageous comparison is one of the most powerful 
psychological mechanisms of disengaging moral control.  As service failure can cause significant 
inconvenience to consumers (Grégoire & Fisher, 2008), advantageous comparison can provide a 
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cognitive mechanism for consumers to rationalize their revenge behaviors.   
 
Moral identity centrality  
Given that moral disengagement involves the deactivation of moral self-regulation, its 
immediate natural antecedent may be the centrality of moral identity WRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VRYHUDOO
self-concept (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Monin, Pizarro & Beer, 2007).  Moral identity centrality 
refers to the degree to which the moral traits are central to self-conception (Aquino & Reed, 2002) 
and has been found to be a primary antecedent of ethical and unethical behaviors (Aquino et al., 
2007; McFerran, Aquino & Duffy, 2010). 
The effect of moral identity centrality on moral disengagement accords with the general 
identity-based motivation model (Shavitt, Torelli & Wong, 2009; Oyserman, 2009).  This model 
synthesizes the various findings of a range of earlier consumer research that examines how 
consumer identities affect behaviors.  First, a salient identity activates relevant meanings and 
elicits mindsets that are conducive to meeting identity goals (Shavitt et al., 2009). Second, a 
mindset that is activated by a certain identity acts as the filter of information processing and 
encourages identity-congruent behavior. Third, the key psychological mechanism of identity-
based motivation is self-consistency; and people are motivated to preserve and stabilize their self-
view by guiding their thoughts and behaviors with their self-conceptions (Swann, Griffin, 
Predmore & Gaines, 1987).   
Regarding the general regulatory function of moral identity centrality on morally relevant 
behaviors (Hardy & Carlo, 2005); a wide range of evidence has emerged.  For example, people 
with higher moral identity centrality are more likely to engage in social volunteering (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002), charitable donation (Aquino et al., 2009), organizational citizenship behaviors 
(McFerran et al., 2010), and general ethical behavior (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). They are also 
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less likely to cheat (Reynolds and Ceranic 2007) and lie (Aquino et al., 2009).  People with 
stronger moral identity centrality tend to hold stronger moral principles and are therefore less 
prone to disengage themselves in evaluating morally relevant acts (Shu et al., 2011).  Prior 
research has demonstrated empirically that moral identity centrality negatively relates to moral 
disengagement.  For example, Detert et al. (2008) find a negative correlation between moral 
identity centrality and general moral disengagement tendency.  However, no prior research has 
examined the relationship between moral identity centrality and moral disengagement of specific 
morally-ambiguous behaviors, such as FRQVXPHUV¶ negative actions towards a firm after service 
failure.  The present research intends to address this issue.   
 
STUDY 1: MOTIVES, MORAL AWARENESS, AND MORAL IDENTITY CENTRALITY 
Motives of negative WOM 
While moral identity centrality generally negatively relates to general moral disengagement 
tendency (Detert et al., 2008), it does not necessarily negatively relate to moral disengagement of 
all specific negative responses towards service failure.  This is because deleterious acts by 
consumers do not necessarily involve immorality.  For example, punishing actors of 
transgressions may be seen as a desirable act in the name of justice (Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010; 
Skarlicki, Van Jaarsveld & Walker, 2008).  Prior research has supported the view that motives of 
behaviors can directly influence the evaluation of those (intentional) behaviors (Malle, 1999).   
Potential motives for negative WOM after service failure could be vengeful in the form of 
vindictive negative WOM or non-vengeful in the form of support-seeking negative WOM 
(Gelbrich, 2010).  This classification is consistent with Reeder, Kumar and Hesson-0F,QQLV¶
(2002) observation that people respond more aggressively to provocation with a motive of 
revenge.  Accordingly, negative WOM can be distinguished in terms of motives: vindictive 
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(retaliatory) negative WOM versus support-seeking negative WOM (see Gelbrich, 2010; Grégoire 
and Fisher, 2008; Grégoire et al., 2010; Grégoire et al., 2009).   This is consistent with the 
dispositional attribution perspective and the social cognitive model suggesting that moral identity 
centrality tends to relate negatively to moral disengagement when the focal behavior of interest 
has a vindictive motive.   
Although the above discussion supports the view that the motive of negative WOM itself 
may influence moral disengagement, it also has implications for how moral identity centrality 
relates to moral disengagement of negative WOM with different motives. People use motives as 
informational input for evaluating RWKHUV¶ behaviors and attribute responsibilities (Reeder et al., 
2002; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli & Bozok, 2006).  From a social cognitive perspective of moral 
judgment (Aquino et al., 2009; Bandura et al., 2001), people possess multiple identities with a 
working self-concept which tends to motivate thinking and action (Markus, 1977; Markus & 
Kunda, 1986). Whether an identity becomes the working self-concept depends on two strongly 
related conditions: accessibility and diagnosticity (Cohen & Reed, 2006; Feldman & Lynch, 1988; 
Lynch et al., 1988). Accessibility refers to the retrieval of certain information from consumer 
memory, while diagnosticity refers to the relevance of certain information for the evaluation task 
(Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Lynch et al., 1988). Situational strengthening of the accessibility and 
diagnosticity of identity-related information activates the regulatory power of the focal identity 
(Skitka, 2003).  The presence of an explicit retaliatory motive (as compared to a support-seeking 
motive) for negative WOM clearly makes the focal issue more morally relevant, which activates 
moral identity centrality to take effect. As vindictive negative WOM is explicitly driven by 
revenge, whilst support-seeking negative WOM is not, we expect that moral identity becomes 
more salient information for people to evaluate vindictive negative WOM and has a negative 
relationship with moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM only.  In addition, because 
8 
the support-seeking motive, as compared to the vindictive motive, of negative WOM itself is 
associated with lower levels of moral relevance, moral disengagement may become absent for 
support-seeking negative WOM. Therefore moral identity centrality becomes an irrelevant 
predictor of support-seeking negative WOM. Thus,  
H1.  Individuals with higher moral identity centrality will exhibit less moral disengagement 
than individuals with lower moral identity centrality for vindictive negative WOM. 
Moral awareness of vindictive negative WOM 
Vindictive negative WOM does not necessarily have the same moral implications for all 
consumers.  We expect that the extent to which moral identity reduces the moral disengagement 
of vindictive negative WOM depends on the level of moral awareness of the behaviors. Moral 
DZDUHQHVVUHIHUVWRD³SHUVRQ¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWDVLWXDWLRQFRQWDLQVPRUDOFRQWHQWDQG
OHJLWLPDWHO\FDQEHFRQVLGHUHGIURPDPRUDOSRLQWRIYLHZ´5H\QROGV, 2006, p.  233). Thus, we 
expect that moral awareness enhances the negative relationship of moral identity centrality with 
moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM.   
According to the salience-diagnosticity perspective of information processing, a piece of 
information is more likely to be processed for judgment when the information is relevant to the 
evaluation task (Ahluwalia & Gurhan-Canli, 2000).  Moral identity, as a self-schema organized 
around a set of moral trait associations, is a potential piece of information for moral judgment 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002), such as evaluating consumer vindictive negative WOM.  People with 
higher moral awareness are more likely to retrieve and rely on the information stored in their 
moral identity to evaluate vindictive negative WOM. This is because moral identity-related 
information is not only more accessible but also more diagnostic for the moral judgment task for 
people with higher awareness of the moral relevance of the behavior.  
In general, moral identity-related knowledge is more accessible and diagnostic for people 
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with higher moral identity centrality (Aquino & Reed, 2002). When people are more aware of the 
moral relevance of the situation, the moral identity-related knowledge becomes even more 
diagnostic (Aquino et al., 2009). Hence, moral identity centrality tends to have a stronger negative 
relationship with moral disengagement for consumers with higher moral awareness of vindictive 
negative WOM.  Given that moral identity centrality does not relate to support-seeking negative 
WOM and that moral relevance of support-seeking negative WOM would be low, we build the 
subsequent formal hypotheses for vindictive negative WOM only.  
H2: Individuals with higher moral identity centrality will exhibit less moral disengagement 
of vindictive negative WOM than individuals with lower moral identity centrality, 
especially when they also have higher moral awareness of the vindictive negative 
WOM. 
 
Sample and procedure  
128 adults (with 125 usable responses) were recruited by street-incepts in public places 
(Meanage = 34.26, sd =12.83; 65 females).  Vignette development follows the conventional 
approach of presenting scenarios of consumer experience of service failure (e.g., Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007).  This approach has also been adopted by prior moral disengagement studies (e.g., 
Aquino et al., 2007; Shu et al., 2011).  We chose hotel noise as a service failure that disrupts hotel 
JXHVWV¶VOHHS (e.g., Gelbrich, 2010).  Sleep has been argued as one of the most important aspect in 
the hospitality sector (Valtonen & Veijola, 2011). We referred to Gelbrich (2010) and Grégoire et 
al. (2009) for the wording of vindictive vs. support-seeking negative WOM.  Vindictive vs. 
support-seeking negative WOM was distinguished through between-subject manipulation. 
As WKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHKRWHO¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\for causing the noise may affect moral 
disengagement (Paharia, Kassam, Greene & Bazeman, 2009), we controlled for the effect of hotel 
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responsibility. To obtain high variance of hotel responsibility, we created two versions of the 
vignette, based on whether the noise is caused by the hotel directly or indirectly.   Accordingly, 
we created four vignettes based on hotel responsibility and the motive of negative WOM.  Sample 
sizes for all cells are: vindictive negative WOM with direct responsibility (n=32), vindictive 
negative WOM with indirect responsibility (n=31), support-seeking negative WOM with direct 
responsibility (n=31), support-seeking negative WOM with indirect responsibility (n=31) 
The hypothetical scenarios describe a story of a job seeker who stayed in a hotel the night 
before an important job interview the following morning.  Due to hotel noise during the night, the 
job seeker did not sleep well, which subsequently affected his interview performance.  Thereafter 
the job seeker commits negative WOM against the hotel for the purpose of either vengeance 
toward the hotel or seeking emotional support.  For manipulation of vindictive negative WOM, 
we wrote ³LQRUGHUWRget revenge on the hotel, John exaggerated the poor quality of the hotel and 
µEDGPRXWKHG¶WKHKRWHOWRKLVIULHQGVDQGHYHQSRVWHGYHU\QHJDWLYHDQGVRPHZKDWH[DJJHUDWHG
UHYLHZVDERXWWKHKRWHODWYDULRXVKRWHOUHYLHZZHEVLWHV´ For support-seeking negative WOM, 
ZHZURWH³«in order to feel better, get some comfort, reduce negative feeling, and share his/her 
feelings with others-RKQWDONHGWRRWKHUSHRSOHDERXWWKHQHJDWLYHH[SHULHQFH´)RUPDQLSXODWLRQ
RIKRWHOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZHZURWH³«because of this constant and loud traffic noise´DVLQGLUHFW
DJHQF\DQG³«GXHWRconstant loud noises, which John later found out was caused by the hotel 
kitchen preparing for breakfast´ 
 
Measures 
All variables were measured by seven-point Likert-type scales (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree). Both seven-point and five-point Likert scales are very popular in survey research (Colman, 
Morris & Preston, 1997; Dawes, 2008). We used seven-point Likert scales as they, unlike five-
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point scales, increase the reliability of the measures due to a positive correlation between the 
number of scale points and measure reliability (Churchill & Peter, 1984). In addition, all 
measures have been used and validated with seven-point Likert scales in the literature, including 
moral awareness (Reynolds, 2006), moral disengagement (Aquino et al., 2007), and moral 
identity centrality (Aquino et al., 2009). Using the same scale point helps the results from 
different studies to be more comparable. We tested the internal reliability of our measures with 
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVFRUHV/LNHDOOSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVXVLQJWKHVHPHDVXUHVWKHLUVcores are above 
the .70 threshold (Nunnally, 1978).   
Moral identity centrality was measured, in consistence with prior literature (Aquino et al., 
2009), via an established five-item moral identity internalization subscale of the self-importance 
of moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (ɚ=.80).  Studies have consistently found that 
moral identity centrality is a stronger indictor of self-importance of moral identity and a stronger 
predictor for moral judgement than moral identity symbolization (Aquino et al., 2009; Detert et 
al., 2008; Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum & Kuenzi, 2012; Reed et al., 2007).  Indeed, recent studies, 
including those of the original authors, have chosen to use only the moral identity internalization 
subscale to represent moral identity centrality (e.g., Aquino et al., 2007; Aquino et al, 2009; 
Winterich et al., 2009; Detert et al., 2008). This research followed this practice and equates moral 
identity centrality with moral identity internalization. The scale was measured prior to the 
presentation of the scenario and followed by some ostensibly unrelated questions. Other variables 
were measured after the scenario.  
Moral awareness (r =.54, a = .70) was measured by two items borrowed from Reynolds 
(µ7KHUHDUHYHU\LPSRUWDQWHWKLFDO DQGPRUDODVSHFWVWRWKLVVLWXDWLRQ¶µ7KLVPDWWHUFOHDUO\
GRHVQRWLQYROYHHWKLFVRUPRUDOLVVXHV¶UHYHUVHFRGLQJMoral disengagement was measured by 
using the four items of advantageous comparison mechanism of moral disengagement (Aquino et 
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al., 2007) (ɚ= .79).  We followed the practice of Aquino et al. (2007) by adapting the items to fit 
WKHVSHFLILFFRQWH[W7KHIRXULWHPVDUH³&RPSDUHGWRZKDWWKHKRWHOKDVGRQHWR-RKQ-RKQ¶V
negative word of mouth ZDVYHU\PLOG´³-RKQ¶VQHJDWLYHZRUGRIPRXWh is no big deal, 
FRQVLGHULQJZKDWWKHKRWHOKDVGRQHWR-RKQ´³-RKQ¶VQHJDWLYHZRUGRIPRXWKZDVQRWWKDW
H[WUHPH´³-RKQ¶VQHJDWLYHZRUGRIPRXWKZDVQRWVHULRXV´ 
 
Manipulation check   
We used two items to measure the perceived responsibility of causing the hotel noise to 
check the significant difference in perceived hotel responsibility across the two versions of 
vignettes based on the cause of the hotel noise (directly caused by the hotel or indirectly).  The 
two items are (r = .79; ɚ ³'R\RXDJUHHWKDWWKH+RWHOVKRXOGEHGLUHFWO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRU
FDXVLQJWKHQRLVH"´³'R\RXDJUHHWKDWWKH+RWHOVKRXOGEHEODPHGIRUWKHQRLVH"´:HDOVRXVHG
the hotel responsibility measure as a control variable for subsequent analyses.  The result shows 
that perceived hotel responsibility is significantly higher under the vignette which says that the 
hotel noise is caused directly by the hotel (Mindirect =3.3 vs.  Mdirect = 5.2, p < .001).  We used the 
measure of perceived hotel responsibility as a control variable for later regression analyses.   
Moral identity centrality does not differ significantly across groups: F = .03, p = .87 
between direct and indirect hotel responsibility; F = 1.67, p = .20 between vindictive negative 
WOM and support-seeking negative WOM; and F = .18, p = .67 for their interaction.  Moral 
awareness is not influenced by moral identity centrality for both vindictive negative WOM and 
support-seeking negative WOM groups (R
2
=.00, p=.90; and R
2
=.01, p=.56 respectively). Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics.   
Insert Table 1 about here. 
Results  
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The covariance equality check between direct and indirect hotel responsibility groups (with 
hotel responsibility, moral identity centrality, moral awareness, and moral disengagement) 
produces an LQVLJQLILFDQWUHVXOW%R[¶V0 3.57 (df = 10, F = .33, p = .97) for vindictive negative 
:20DQG%R[¶V0 GI F = .88, p = .56) for support-seeking negative WOM.  No 
significant interaction was found between direct vs. indirect hotel responsibility groups and all the 
independent variables and their interactions. Therefore we collapsed the two groups. The dataset 
was also checked against Mahalanobis-Distance critical value (Fidell & Tabachnick, 2003). Table 
2 presents the regression results for Study 1 for both vindictive negative WOM sample (n=63) 
and support-seeking negative WOM sample (n=62).  We standardized the continuous independent 
variables before generating the interaction term (Aiken and West 1991).   
Insert Table 2 about here. 
First, Study 1 supports H1 in that moral identity centrality negatively relates to moral 
disengagement of vindictive negative WOM (ȕ = -.47, p <.001).  H2 predicts that moral identity 
has a stronger negative relationship with moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM when 
perceived moral awareness is high.  H2 is supported for vindictive negative WOM (ȕ = -.26, p 
<.05), as shown by Figure 1.  We plotted this graph based on standard procedure (one standard 
deviation above or below the mean as higher or lower score for the moderator) and tested the 
significance of the simple slope (Aiken & West, 1991).  When moral awareness is lower, moral 
disengagement is 3.1 vs. 2.8 when moral identity centrality is lower vs. higher. When moral 
awareness is higher, moral disengagement is 3.9 vs. 2.6 when moral identity centrality is lower vs. 
higher. Thus, moral identity centrality has a stronger negative relationship with moral 
disengagement of vindictive negative WOM when moral awareness is higher (which is one 
standard deviation above the mean) than when moral awareness is lower (one standard deviation 
above the mean).  As expected, moral identity centrality is not significantly related to moral 
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disengagement of support-seeking negative WOM.   
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
Discussion for Study 1 
Study 1 supports the view that the relationship between moral identity centrality and 
negative WOM depends on the motives of the negative WOM. In addition, Study 1 finds moral 
identity centrality has a stronger negative relationship with moral disengagement of vindictive 
negative WOM for people who are more aware of the moral issue involved with the behavior.  
This finding supports the view that both objective moral relevance of the behavior (i.e. motives) 
and subjective moral awareness of the moral issue are important conditions for SHRSOH¶Vmoral 
identity centrality to regulate moral judgment (moral disengagement in this case) of morally-
ambiguous behavior.  This result offers important additional evidence on the recently proposed 
social-cognitive model of moral identity-based motivation (Aquino et al., 2009) in the context of 
consumer negative WOM due to service failure.  While Study 1 supports our predictions, the 
social-cognitive model largely fails to address the potentially important role of emotions.  
Research on moral psychology suggests that emotions may exert both direct and moderating 
effects on moral judgment (Greene, 2009).  Study 2 aims to integrate moral emotions into the 
social-cognitive model.   
 
STUDY 2: ANGER AND MORAL IDENTITY CENTRALITY 
Anger toward service failure 
Emotions have been paid increasing attention in research on moral judgment (e.g., Bartels, 
2008; Haidt, 2001; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001; Tangney, Stuewig & 
Mashek, 2007).  Indeed, the impact of emotion is particularly salient in the context of service 
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failure in the hotel sector (Gelbrich, 2010; Sánchez-García & Currás-Pérez, 2011; Menon & Dubé, 
2004; Smith & Bolton, 2002) and tourist experiences in general (del Bosque & Martín, 2008). 
Anger is a common and morally relevant emotional reaction to a service failure (e.g., Bonifield & 
Cole, 2007; 2008; Gelbrich, 2010; Gino & Schweitzer, 2008; Sánchez-García & Currás-Pérez, 
2011).  Indeed, a certain emotion is more likely to influence judgment when the emotional feeling 
is salient, representative for the target, and relevant to the evaluation task (Adaval, 2001; 
Greifeneder, Bless & Pham, 2011; Pham, 1998).  Anger represents such an emotion in the context 
of service failure.  
The process of moral disengagement requires processing relevant information; information 
that could be both cognitive and emotional (Greene, 2009).  Emotion may act as information 
input (i.e. affect heuristic) for judgment and evaluation (Pham & Avnet, 2009).  Indeed, Haidt 
(2001) notes that moral judgment may be a result of quick and automatic evaluations that may 
directly stem from immediate emotional reactions, instead of moral reasoning.  Greene et al. 
(2001) provide evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that the 
emotional engagement with moral dilemma influences moral judgment.   
$QJHUVHUYHV³moral functions LQWKDWLWFDQPRWLYDWHµWKLUG-SDUW\¶ bystanders to take action 
in order to remedy observed injustices´ (Tangney et al., 2007, p. 361).  In this sense, anger may 
PRWLYDWHµWKLUG-parties¶WRUDWLRQDOL]HWKHµYLFWLP¶V¶ revenge behavior (i.e., vindictive negative 
WOM) to the company causing the service failure. AQJHUKDVWKHDWWULEXWHRIµDSSURDFK¶
motivation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, Mennitt & Harmon-
Jones, 2011). For example, it has been found that anger reduces risk estimation of actions and 
enhances risk taking behaviors (Fessler, Pillsworth & Flamson, 2004; Han, Lerner & Keltner, 
2007; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), which suggests that 
anger supports vengeful actions, such as vindictive negative WOM.  Thus, prior research 
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indicates that anger predicts vindictive negative WOM (e.g., Gelbrich, 2010).   
So far, we have established that anger may directly relate to moral disengagement. However, 
emotions tend to directly shape (acting as information) judgment and decision making when 
cognitive resource is low; and the direct effect of emotions may disappear when cognitive 
resource is high (Forgas, 1995; Forgas & George, 2001; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; 2002). The 
presence of moral awareness indicates that cognitive resources are available to support the moral 
evaluation of a situation (Reynolds, 2006). Therefore when moral awareness is low, anger is more 
likely to act as an affect heuristic to directly shape moral disengagement of the act of vindictive 
negative WOM. Thus we expect that the relationship between anger and moral disengagement 
exists only when moral awareness is lower.  
H3.  Individuals with higher anger toward service failure will exhibit more moral 
disengagement of vindictive negative WOM than individuals with lower anger, only for 
those with lower moral awareness of the vindictive negative WOM. 
 
(PRWLRQPD\DOVRLQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶Vreasoning process (Pham, 2007), such as the 
evaluative weight given to certain information (Adaval, 2001).  Prior studies support the view that 
emotions may moderate the relationship between certain moral information and moral judgment 
by activating the salience of that moral information (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Baumeister et al., 
2007; Huebner et al., 2009; Malhotra & Kuo, 2009).  As noted by Algoe and Haidt (2009, p.  22), 
³«HPRWLRQVPD\QRWOHDGWRLPPHGLDWHEHKDYLRU«UDWKHUWKH\FKDQJHSHRSOH¶VFRJQLWLRQVDQG
motivations in ways that make it easier for them to build relationships and skills, especially if 
VXFKRSSRUWXQLWLHVSUHVHQWWKHPVHOYHVLQWKHHQYLURQPHQW´ 
There has been evidence suggesting that negative emotion tends to inhibit information 
accessibility and/or invalidate accessible cognitions (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). For example, 
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Tiedens and Linton (2001) finds that anger would result in simple and shallow heuristic 
processing, which suggests that anger may inhibit the regulatory function of moral identity 
centrality on moral disengagement. This is because anger may negatively affect how people 
retrieve and rely on the information stored in moral identity to evaluate vindictive negative WOM.  
Indeed, a recent study finds that anger toward the events of Hurricane Katrina facilitated heuristic 
evaluation processes (i.e. less reliance on cognitive knowledge) in blame attribution (Malhotra & 
Kuo, 2009).  Gino and Schweitzer (2008) find that people who feel anger are less likely to be 
receptive to advice.  Since moral identity centrality is a type of cognitive knowledge (self-schema) 
that is relevant to moral judgment (Aquino & Reed, 2002), people with higher level of anger 
toward the service failure are less likely to retrieve and activate this cognitive knowledge 
associated with moral identity centrality to inform their moral judgment of vindictive negative 
WOM. Thus,    
H4.   Individuals with higher moral identity centrality will exhibit less moral disengagement 
of vindictive negative WOM than individuals with lower moral identity centrality, 
especially when they also have lower anger toward service failure. 
 
We have argued that anger tends to shape moral judgment when moral awareness is lower, 
whilst moral identity centrality tends to have a stronger negative relationship with moral 
disengagement of vindictive negative WOM when moral awareness is higher. We have also 
argued that anger and moral identity centrality are two competing forces for moral judgment, in 
that anger may undermine the regulatory role of moral identity centrality on moral judgment. 
Thus, we expect that the attenuating effect of anger on the effect of moral identity centrality will 
exist only when moral awareness is lower. As noted earlier, anger may result in heuristic 
processing and may undermine the effect of moral identity centrality (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). 
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Since moral awareness itself is not a main factor on moral judgment, it is not of a focal concern to 
examine the main or conditional effect of moral awareness on moral disengagement. Instead, it is 
theoretically sounder and more parsimonious to treat moral awareness as a moderator of how 
anger and moral identity centrality interact to influence moral disengagement. Thus, moral 
awareness may enhance the negative relationship between moral identity centrality and moral 
disengagement (H2), while moral awareness also reduces the salience of anger for moral 
disengagement (H3). Hence when moral awareness is higher, anger is less likely to be a salient 
IDFWRURQQRWRQO\PRUDOGLVHQJDJHPHQWEXWDOVRRQDQJHU¶VPRGHUDWLQJUROHLQWKHUHODWLRQVKLS
between moral identity centrality and moral disengagement. Accordingly, we expect the negative 
effect of moral identity centrality on moral disengagement will be stronger, regardless of anger, 
when moral awareness is higher. Conversely, when moral awareness is lower (meaning a lack of 
cognitive knowledge of the moral relevance of the issue); people are likely to rely on their 
emotions to intervene the process of moral judgment. Moreover, given that one way how anger 
intervenes the process of moral judgment is (according to H4) through reducing the effect of 
moral identity centrality on moral disengagement, we expect that anger will moderate the 
negative relationship between moral identity centrality and moral disengagement, mainly when 
moral awareness is lower. Thus,  
H5.  When moral awareness of the vindictive negative WOM is lower, individuals with 
higher moral identity centrality will exhibit less moral disengagement of vindictive 
negative WOM than individuals with lower moral identity centrality, only when they 
also have lower anger toward service failure. When moral awareness of the vindictive 
negative WOM is higher, individuals with higher moral identity centrality will exhibit 
less moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM than individuals with lower 
moral identity centrality regardless of anger.  
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Sample and procedure 
The convenience sample consists of 203 (198 usable) students recruited on campus 
(Meanage = 20.73, sd = 2.74; 101 females). Procedure and scenarios are similar to Study 1. 
Although Study 1 supports that moral identity centrality only affect moral disengagement of 
vindictive negative WOM, in Study 2, we still added a sample for the support-seeking negative 
WOM to further confirm this effect.  We obtained 97 for vindictive negative WOM and 101 for 
support-seeking negative WOM. Sample sizes for all cells are: vindictive negative WOM with 
direct responsibility (n=45), vindictive negative WOM with indirect responsibility (n=52), 
support-seeking negative WOM with direct responsibility (n=51), support-seeking negative 
WOM with indirect responsibility (n=50). 
 
Measures and manipulation check 
Anger toward the hotel was measured by two items on seven-point Likert scales borrowed 
from Gelbrich (2010): angry and mad (r = 85, ɚ = .91). We asked the participants to imagine that 
they were the hotel guest and to what extent they would feel angry (mad) with the hotel. The 
mean of anger and standard deviation in our study for vindictive negative WOM group is 4.3 (1-7 
point scale) and 1.1 respectively, and for support-seeking negative WOM is 4.1 and 1.3 
respectively. This pattern is similar to other measures in the study, suggesting that anger was 
simulated successfully (Aquino et al. 2007; Gelbrich, 2010). All other measures were the same as 
those in Study 2.  $OOYDULDEOHV¶LQWHUQDOUHOLDELOLWLHVDUHDGHTXDWH.  As expected, perceived hotel 
responsibility is significantly higher under the vignette which says that the hotel noise is caused 
directly by the hotel (Mindirect =3.2 vs.  Mdirect = 4.7, p < .001).  Like Study 1, we used the measure 
of perceived hotel responsibility as a control variable for later regression analyses. There is no 
significant difference in moral identity centrality across groups:  F = 2.37, p = .13 between direct 
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and indirect hotel responsibility; F = .28, p = .60 between vindictive negative WOM and support-
seeking negative WOM; and F = .14, p = .71 for their interaction. Anger is not influenced by 
moral identity centrality for both vindictive negative WOM and support-seeking negative WOM 
groups (R
2
=.00, p=.95; and R
2
=.01, p=.34 respectively). Moral awareness is also not influenced 
by moral identity centrality for both groups (R
2
=.00, p=.69; and R
2
=.00, p=.63 respectively). The 
dataset was also checked against Mahalanobis-Distance critical value (Fidell & Tabachnick, 
2003). Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of Study 2.    
Insert Table 3 about here. 
Results of Study 2 
Covariance equality checks between direct and indirect hotel responsibility groups show no 
significant difference in covariance of focal variables (that is, with hotel responsibility, MI 
centrality, moral awareness, moral disengagement, and DQJHU%R[¶V0 17.62 (df = 15, F = 
1.11, p = .34) for vindictive negative :20DQG%R[¶V0 GI = 15, F = 1.26, p = .22) for 
support-seeking negative WOM. No significant interaction was found between direct vs. indirect 
hotel responsibility groups and all the independent variables and their interactions. Therefore we 
collapsed the two groups. Table 4 presents the results of the regression models.   
Insert Table 4 about here. 
Step 1 tests the main effects. It shows that moral identity centrality has a significant 
negative relationship with moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM (n=96; ȕ= -.24, p 
< .05), which supports H1.  Step 2 tests the two-way interactive effects involving moral identity 
centrality, moral awareness, and anger. The results show that moral awareness significantly 
enhances the negative relationship between moral identity centrality and moral disengagement (ȕ
= -.43, p < .001). When moral awareness is lower, moral disengagement is 3.6 vs. 4.0 when moral 
identity centrality is lower vs. higher. When moral awareness is higher, moral disengagement is 
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4.4 vs. 3.1 when moral identity centrality is lower vs. higher. Clearly, Figure 2 shows that when 
moral awareness is higher (lower), moral identity centrality has a stronger (weaker) negative 
relationship with moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM, which supports H2.  
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
H3 predicts that moral awareness moderates the effect of anger on moral disengagement in 
that anger positively relates to moral disengagement when moral awareness is lower. Although 
the direct main effect of anger is not significant, the interaction between anger and moral 
awareness is significant (ȕ= -.24, p < .05). We plotted the pattern of this effect in Figure 3, which 
indicates that anger positively relates to moral disengagement (ȕ= 36, p < .01) when moral 
awareness is lower (with moral disengagement being 3.4 vs. 4.1 when anger is lower vs. higher), 
but not so when moral awareness is median or high. Thus H3 is supported.  
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
H4 argues that anger negatively moderates the relationship between moral identity 
centrality and moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM. Step 2 shows that the 
interaction between anger and moral identity centrality is significant (ȕ= .17, p < .05), suggesting 
that, in general, anger reduces the negative relationship between moral identity centrality and 
moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM. When anger is lower, the coefficient of the 
effect of moral identity centrality is -.41, with moral disengagement being 4.0 vs. 3.2 when moral 
identity centrality is lower vs. higher. When moral awareness is higher, the coefficient of the 
effect of moral identity centrality is -.07, with moral disengagement being 4.0 vs. 3.8 when moral 
identity centrality is lower vs. higher. Figure 4 shows that when anger is higher (lower), the 
negative relationship between moral identity centrality and vindictive negative WOM is weaker 
(stronger). Thus H4 is supported.  
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
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H5 contends that anger negatively moderates the negative relationship between moral 
identity centrality and moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM, especially when moral 
awareness is lower. Step 3 adds the three-way interaction among them (ȕ= -.43, p < .01). Figure 
5 illustrates this three-interaction effect by plotting the relationship between moral identity 
centrality and vindictive negative WOM when both anger and moral awareness are higher and 
lower (one standard deviation above and below the mean) (Dawson & Richter, 2006). When 
moral awareness is lower (slope 2 and 4), anger significantly negatively moderates the negative 
relationship between moral identity centrality and moral disengagement of vindictive negative 
WOM (p < .001 between slope 2 and 4). Specifically, under a lower moral awareness condition, 
when anger is lower, moral disengagement is 4.2 vs. 3.2 when moral identity centrality is lower 
vs. higher; while when anger is higher, moral disengagement is 3.2 vs. 4.9 when moral identity 
centrality is lower vs. higher. Thus moral identity centrality has a negative relationship with moral 
disengagement only when anger is lower for those whose moral awareness is lower. However, 
when moral awareness is higher (slope 1 and 3), anger does not moderate the effect of moral 
identity centrality (p =.19 between slope 1 and 3), meaning that moral identity centrality has a 
negative relationship with moral disengagement regardless of anger. Specifically, under a higher 
moral awareness condition, whether anger is lower or higher, moral disengagement is higher 
(lower) when moral identity centrality is lower (higher), with moral disengagement being 4.1 vs. 
3. 6 (when anger is lower) or 4.2 vs. 3.2 (when anger is higher).  Thus H5 is supported. None of 
these effects is significant for support-seeking negative WOM.   
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
Discussion of Study 2 
Study 2 successfully replicated the results of Study 1 regarding hypotheses 1 and 2. In this 
regard, people with higher moral identity centrality are less likely to be morally disengaged from 
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vindictive negative WOM, especially for people with higher moral awareness of the behavior. 
Moreover6WXG\IXUWKHUILQGVWKDWDQJHUPRUDOHPRWLRQSOD\VDQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQSHRSOH¶V
moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOM in that anger not only has a positive 
relationship with moral disengagement when moral awareness is lower, but also attenuates the 
negative relationship between moral identity centrality and moral disengagement especially when 
moral awareness is lower. Study 2 contributes to this research by extending Study 1 through 
incorporating the role of moral emotion (anger) in the relationship between moral identity 
centrality and moral disengagement.  
CONCLUSION 
Theoretical implications 
This research finds that moral identity centrality has a negative relationship with the moral 
disengagement of vindictive negative WOM; and that this relationship tends to be stronger for 
people with higher moral awareness of the vindictive negative WOM and less anger towards the 
service failure. This research advances the literature on consumer responses to service failure, 
particularly in the hospitality and tourism sector.  Prior research on this area main focuses on the 
cognitive processes, such as attribution (Hess et al., 2007), perceived justice (Grégoire & Fisher, 
2008), and consumer power (Grégoire et al., 2010).  Although the factors relating to emotional 
reactions have received increasing attention (e.g. Gelbrich, 2010), previous studies primary focus 
on the independent effects of cognitive and emotional factors.  This study provides a novel 
integral angle of examining this issue through incorporating moral identity (a social identity 
angle), moral cognition, and moral emotion (i.e., anger).  In this respect, the research extends 
beyond the traditional focus on the separate effects of cognition and emotion to revealing the 
identity-based motivation mechanisms and how identity-based motivation is conditional on 
cognitive factors (e.g. motives and issue awareness) and emotional factors (e.g. anger).   
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With regard to the moral identity literature, this research not only supports the negative 
relationship of moral identity centrality with moral disengagement, but also extends our 
knowledge on moral identity¶VUHJXOatory function of moral cognition by identifying its cognitive 
and affective conditions.  First, this research offers an additional test, in a different context, of the 
recent social-cognitive model of moral identity motivation (Aquino et al., 2009) by identifying 
motives of moral acts as a key condition of moral identity regulation.  Moral identity regulates 
behaviors only when the behaviors involve morally relevant motives.  Thus, moral identity 
regulates behaviors of those who have higher moral awareness of the issue involved.  Second, this 
research provides very important initial evidence on the moderating role of emotions on moral 
identity¶VUHJXODWRU\IXQFWLRQ.  We find that anger (as a negative emotion) toward the cause of 
unethical behaviors (i.e., consumer revenge stemming from service failure) not only has a main 
positive relationship on moral disengagement, but also undermines the effect of moral identity 
centrality on moral disengagement. Further, both effects exist particularly when moral awareness 
is low.  In this respect, this study represents a pioneering effort on integrating moral cognition, 
moral emotions, and moral identity in explaining moral judgment.   
In terms of the moral disengagement literature, this research offers important initial 
evidence on an identity-based perspective of moral disengagement of specific morally-relevant 
behaviors.  Although recent research has found that moral identity centrality (in general) 
negatively relates to a broad moral disengagement tendency (Detert et al., 2008), little evidence 
exists on whether (and how) moral identity centrality regulates moral disengagement of specific 
behaviors.  The findings of the current study offer strong evidence on an identity-based 
motivation of moral disengagement.  
Finally, for the consumer emotions literature, we provide important evidence on the prior 
(but poorly evidenced) claim that emotions do not necessarily only have main effects on thinking 
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and doing, but also may activate or deactivate other morally relevant information input (e.g., 
moral identity centrality) (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Baumeister et al., 2007; Huebner et al., 2009).  
This research provides empirical evidence supporting that emotions act not only as important 
information input for moral judgment, but also as affective context for information processing.  
Specifically this research finds that anger constrains the regulatory function of moral identity 
centrality with regard to moral judgment of vindictive negative WOM derived from service 
failure, when moral cognition is low.  In this sense, consumers get blinded by anger in their moral 
cognition and moral judgment, which echoes a recent research finding that employees get 
³blinded´ by anger in moral judgment (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008).  More importantly, this 
research provides evidence on the notion that social cognition can neutralize the undermining 
effect of negative emotion (i.e. anger in this research) on identity-based regulation on social 
judgment.  
 
Managerial implications  
This research offers service firms a number of mechanisms of preventing moral 
disengagement.  As moral identity centrality in general tends to be more stable and therefore less 
OLNHO\WREHPDQDJHDEOHIRUDVSHFLILFFRQVXPHUFRPSDQLHVFDQPDQDJHFRQVXPHUV¶PRUDO
awareness of retaliatory misbehavior (e.g., vindictive negative WOM) and anger toward service 
failure. First, service providers can leverage consumer moral awareness. Our research finds that 
moral identity centrality inhibits moral disengagement of vindictive negative WOW especially 
when moral awareness of the behavior is higher.  Hotels can, for example, promote the moral 
relevance of retaliatory misbehavior on their websites or other media tools that may communicate 
to consumers effectively. For example, hotel personnel could engage with peer-to-peer hotel 
review websites; where appropriately, apologizing, explaining, appeasing, and if needed 
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appealing for equity and thus evoking moral engagement. While such reactions to negative WOM 
might be seen by some as manipulative or even controlling, astute intervention are likely to prove 
more beneficial than harmful.  Future research is needed to explore how such pre-emptive or 
reactive tactics can be effectively managed.         
Second, another way to help hotels to prevent retaliatory consumer misbehavior is to 
manage consumer anger.  :KLOHWKHDGYLFHWRµPDQDJHDQJHU¶LVIDUIURPQHZRXUVWXG\suggests 
that managing anger has a hitherto unacknowledged benefit with regard to moral identity 
regulation. This is because this research finds that customers with lower anger are more likely to 
regulate their moral disengagement by their moral identity centrality. Hotels and their employees 
dealing with service failure should be trained to recognize, control, and (where appropriate) 
appease customer anger during service failure. Through highlighting the efforts of the service 
provider to prevent, solve, or recompense service failure and when appeasing disgruntled 
customers, service personnel should stress the efforts the firm has taken in order to provoke 
customer moral engagement or reengagement and thus reduce the possibility of future ethically 
questionable acts such as vindictive negative WOM. In this regard we suggest that hotels should 
proactively encourage customers to contact them directly and immediately after service failure, so 
that customer anger can be managed (cathartically) before it leads to other potentially damaging 
behavior, such as so many of the peer-to-peer customer reviews found on hotel review websites. 
Third, the research finds that moral awareness may neutralize the main effect and 
undermine the effect of anger on moral identity-based self-regulation. When customers become 
angry, without astute management, they are likely to engage in vindictive negative WOM, even if 
they hold higher moral identity centrality. One way to minimize these potential harmful acts of 
angry customers is through a two-part strategy. First, anger should be alleviated to a sufficient 
degree so that cognitive resource is made available. Second, the moral relevance of the potential 
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vindictive negative WOM toward the firm should be raised.  Doing so will discourage angry 
customers from engaging in vindictive negative WOM, and enable them to have stronger self-
control by their moral identity.  For example, when hotel guests check out, receptionists can ask 
the service experience of the guests. If the guests immediately expressed dissatisfaction, the 
receptionists can appease, apologize, or justify as necessary. Where guests express satisfaction, 
records can be made and service personnel rewarded accordingly.  Such systems would enable the 
subsequent identification of areas of high customer satisfaction and equally importantly areas 
where satisfaction is not high.   
 
Limitations and future research  
First, we use hotel noise as an example for service failure.  Although unwanted noise is an 
issue in service provision in many contexts, service failure can also arise from other issues.  
Future study should test our theoretical framework for other types of service failures.  Second, we 
demonstrate that emotional reactions may moderate the effect of moral identity by using anger as 
an example.  Future research can examine other types of emotions, especially positive emotions, 
and investigate whether positive emotions (e.g., happiness) would enhance, instead of undermine, 
the effect of moral identity.  Third, regarding the moderating effect of moral awareness, although 
this is an important cognitive moderator for moral identity regulation on moral disengagement, 
there are other cognitive or cognitive-situational factors that may moderate the effect of moral 
identity.  Thus, for example, future research can examine whether monetary compensation 
interacts with moral identity in affecting moral disengagement of retaliatory consumer 
misbehavior.  Justice or injustice may be another important factor that may interact with moral 
identity in affecting moral disengagement.   
Fourth, this research focuses on one type of customer revenge behaviors (vindictive 
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negative WOM).  Future research can also examine other types of customer revenge behaviors, 
such as retaliatory complaints and psychological harmful conduct, instead of negative WOM.  
Fifth, this research concentrates on one pivotal mechanism of moral disengagement (advantageous 
comparison), future research can examine whether and how moral identity affects other types of 
moral disengagement, such as moral justification or distortion of consequence.  Sixth, both of our 
studies reported in this paper are based on vignettes. Vignette research design is a popular method 
in studying similar research issue (Aquino et al. 2007; Shu et al. 2011). However it has relatively 
lower external validity, partly due to the compressed nature of the time frame between service 
failure, emotional response and vindictive act in the vignette. In addition, anger produced with 
vignettes is more like a cognitive representation of anger (hypothetical anger based on the 
evaluation of a situation). It may differ from anger in real life particularly in terms of intensity. 
We encourage future research to use a mixed method including both vignette design and 
experience recall design. Moreover, due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, the effects found 
in this research should not be interpreted as causal effects, but as relational effects. Finally, future 
research can explore the merit of applying the mindfulness-based therapy (Piet & Hougaard, 2011) 
to angry customers, so that the potential harming effects of customer anger can be minimized.   
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